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"If I'm confirmed, I'll be myself," stated then Supreme Court nominee Samuel 
Ali to at his confirmation hearings on January 11, 2006.1 The conservative justice would 
stay true to his word while serving as the 11 Oth Supreme Court Justice since January 31, 
2006. 
This paper will detail the life of Samuel Alito, the New Jersey born lawyer whose 
dream was to someday become a Supreme Court Justice. Further, this paper will provide 
a description of Justice Ali to's jurisprudential, approach, as well as an analysis of ten of 
i 
his opinions covering a variety of topics. Finally, I will discuss my view on how Justice 
Alito's background and jurisprudential approach have influenced those opinions since 
joining the Court. 
Biography of Justice Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr. 
Justice Alito was born in Trenton, New Jersey on April 1, 1950 to Samuel and 
Rose Ali to, both of whom were schoolteachers. Justice Ali to was raised in Hamilton 
Township, New Jersey, near Trenton, where he attended Steiner High School. After high 
school, Justice Alito went on to obtain an undergraduate degree from Princeton 
University _2 During his time at Princeton, Justice Ali to became involved with the 
American Whig-Cliosophic Society, leading a Debate Panel on various issues such as the 
decriminalization of sodomy and the ending of discrimination in hiring practices. 3 Justice 
1 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1556319/posts. 
2 Alito Called 'Perfect' Student, The Washington Times (December 13, 2005) 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/dec/13/20051213-123632-5671r/. 
This article discusses Justice Alito's upbringing and early school years. 
3 http://whigclio.princeton.edu/history/. History of the American Whig Cliosophic 
Society. The American Whig-Cliosophic Society is the oldest college literary and 
debating club in the United States. Originally two separate groups, Whig and Clio (as 
they have been known commonly for most of their history) grew out of two earlier 
student societies, the Plain Dealing Club (Whig) and the Well Meaning Club (Clio), 
2 
Alito was also a member of the Concerned Alwnni of Princeton (CAP), a conservative 
group formed in 1972. It is said that the primary purpose of CAP was to oppose 
Princeton's decisions regarding affirmative action, as well as limit the number of women 
who attended Princeton. Justice Ali to's association with CAP would come back to haunt 
him while awaiting confirmation on his nomination to the Supreme Court. 4 Justice Ali to 
graduated from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs with a Bachelor of Arts in 1972. In his yearbook, Justice Ali to left a 
message stating that he had hoped to one day be a member of the Supreme Court. 5 
Also during his time at Princeton, Justice Alito received a low lottery number in 
the Selective Service draft. To avoid being drafted immediately, Justice Alito joined 
Princeton's Reserve Officers' Training Corps instead.6 Justice Alito would go on to be 
commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Signal Corps after graduating 
from Princeton and was assigned to the United States Army Reserve. After graduating 
founded about 1765 to promote literary and debating activities. Similar groups had 
appeared in other American colleges during the eighteenth century; most of them had 
been short-lived. Such was the fate of the Plain Dealing and Well Meaning Clubs; 
conflicts between the two groups led to their suppression in March 1 7 69. 
4 Joe Conason, Alita's Ugly Association, Salon (January 13, 2006, 2:00PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2006/01/13/alito_controversy/. 
This article described Justice Ali to's association with Concerned Alumni of Princeton. 
Having been categorized as a racist grou many criticized Ali to's involvement with 
CAP. Justice Alito included his me e,~s i~e .organization on a job application he filled 
out in 1985 to work for the Reagan nlistratlon. However, no other CAP files were 
found tying Ali to to CAP. 
5 Alito has a record of steady conservatism, reputation for civility, Chicago Tribune 
(October 31, 2005), 
http://www .mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/politics/13 046683 .htm. 
6 Alito Joined ROTC While at Princeton, The Washington Post (November 3, 2005), 
http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/02/ AR200511 0202722.h 
tml. 
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from Yale Law, Justice Alito served on activity duty until in 1975, then on inactive duty 
until he was honorably discharged in 1980. 
After graduating from Princeton in 1972, Justice Ali to was admitted into Yale 
Law School where he graduated in 197 5. At Yale, Justice Ali to was the editor of the Yale 
law Journal.7 Following law school, Justice Alito would go on to clerk for Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judge Leonard I. Garth in 1976 and 1977 in Newark, New Jersey. From 
1977 to 1981, Alito was the Assistant United States District Attorney in New Jersey. 
!. ! 
Following that position, Justice Alito became the Assistant to Solicitor General Rex E. 
Lee from 1981 to 1985, arguing a dozen cases before the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Following his position as the Assistant Solicitor General, Justice Alito became the 
Deputy Assistant to Attorney General Edwin Meese from 1985-1987. Thereafter, Justice 
Alito would become the United States Attorney for the District ofNew Jersey from 1987 
until he was nominated to become a Court of Appeals Judge by President H.W. Bush in 
1990.8 
Having been rated as "well qualified" by the American Bar Association, Justice 
Alito was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on April27, 1990 to serve as a judge in 
the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals.9 As a Third Circuit judge, Justice Alito 
7 Samuel A. Alito's Note, The Yale Law Journal (August 31, 2005), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-joumal-pocket-partlsupreme-courtlsamuel-
a.-alito's-note/. 
8 http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme _ courtljustices/alito.html 
9 Joel Roberts, Alito Sworn in as High Court Justice (January 31, 2006, 8:56AM), 
http:/ /www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/0 1/31/politics/main1260362.shtml. 
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wrote noteworthy opinions dealing with First 10, Fourth11 12, and Eighth Amendment 
issues, as well as civil rights issues. 13 
During his time serving on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito was also able to spend 
time as an adjunct professor at Seton Hall Law from 1999 to 2004. While at Seton Hall 
Law, Justice Alito taught courses in Constitutional Law and a course on terrorism and 
civil liberties. After Justice Alito left his position as a Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
judge and adjunct professor for a seat on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Alito 
; : 
came back to Seton Hall Law in 2007 to deliver a commencement speech for the 
graduating class. 
Of the nine Supreme Court Justices, Justice Ali to is still considered to be 
relatively new to the bench. Only Sonia Sotomayor (2009) and Elena Kagan (20 1 0) have 
shorter current tenures as Justices. On October 31, 2005, Justice Ali to was nominated by 
10 Saxe v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001), Justice Alito 
wrote the majority opinion holding that a public school district's anti-harassment policy 
was unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore violated First Amendment guarantees of 
free speech. Alito's opinion stated, "No court or legislature has ever suggested that 
unwelcome speech directed at another's 'values' may be prohibited under the rubric of 
anti -discrimination." 
11 Doe v. Groody, 361 F .3d 232 (3d Cir. 2004), majority held that a strip search of a 
mother and daughter located in a home to be searched according to a properly executed 
search warrant, but were not criminal suspects named in the warrant, was 
unconstitutional. Alito, dissenting, argued that qualified immunity should have protected 
police officers from a finding of having violated constitutional rights when they strip-
searched the mother and her daughter. 
12 Strip-Searcll.GreaLikelyTopicatAlitoHearing,FoxNews(November 28, 2005), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/11/28/strip-search-case-likely-topic-at-alito-
hearing/. 
Justice Ali to's opinion drew much criticism from Democrats opposing his nomination to 
the Supreme Court for being an "extremist." 
13 Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003), Justice Alito wrote the majority 
opinion granting a writ of habeas corpus to a black state prisoner after state courts had 
refused to consider the testimony of a witness who stated that a juror had uttered 
derogatory remarks about blacks during an encounter in the courthouse after the 
conclusion of the trial. 
5 
President George W. Bush to take over for retiring justice, Sandra Day O'Connor. 14 
However, Justice Alito was not President Bush's first or even second choice to be 
O'Connor's replacement. Originally, current Chief Justice John Roberts was nominated 
to fill the vacancy to be left by O'Connor. Due to the sudden death of then Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, President Bush withdrew Roberts' nomination to fill O'Connor's seat 
and nominated Roberts to fill Chief Justice Rehnquist's seat. President Bush then 
nomipated Harriet Miers to replace 0' Connor. Miers would ~ithdraw her nomination 
. i 
after receiving widespread criticism from conservatives. After Miers withdrew her 
nomination, Justice Ali to was finally nominated. Justice Ali to's nomination was met with 
opposition from many Democratic Senators, who characterized Alito as being a "hard-
right conservative."15 During his confirmation hearing, Justice Alito was asked about his 
past association with the Conservative Alumni of Princeton, as well as his stance on 
abortion. 16 The American Civil Liberties Union also formally opposed Justice Alito's 
nomination. Nonetheless, the Senate confirmed Justice Alito on January 31,2006 by a 
vote of 58-42. 17 Justice Alito became the 11 Oth Justice to serve on the Court, as well as 
the 11th Catholic and only the second Italian-American to serve. 
Justice A lito's jurisprudential approach 
14 Bush Picks Appeals Court Judge to Succeed O'Connor on Court, The New York Times 
(October 31, 2005), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2005/1 0/31/politics/politicsspeciall/31 cnd-
court.html?ex=1136955600&en=7f7e8f24c9ed7674&ei=5070& r=1&. 
This article describes the course of events that took place leading to Justice Ali to being 
nominated to the Supreme Court. 
15 There Will Be No One to the Right of Sam Alito, (October 31, 2005, 8:17AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2005/1 0/3112381/alito-turley/. 
16Jane Roh, Dems Slam Alito's Alumni Group, Fox News (January 12, 2006), 
http://www .foxnews.com/story /2006/01/12/ dems-slam-alito-alumni -group/. 
17 David Welna, Alito Confirmed as Newest Supreme Court Justice, National Public 
Radio (January 31, 2006, 6:22 PM), 
http://www .npr .org/templates/ story /story. php ?story Id=5181 091. 
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Justice Ali to is well known for his conservative stance on issues. He is one of the 
most conservative Justices on the court alongside Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts. 
According to a U.S. News article, as of2008, Justice Alito had voted conservative on 
Supreme Court issues 74% of the time. 18 He is sometimes referred to by the nickname 
"Scalito" in reference to similarities to Justice Scalia's conservative views and Italian 
roots. 19 However, Alito has also been described as having "a substantial libertarian 
dimension to his jurisprudence as well as a conservative one."20 In his first term serving 
; ; 
as Supreme Court Justice, three cases had to be reargued since Justice Alito was to be the 
deciding vote. In each of those three cases, Justice Ali to voted with the four other 
conservative Justices in order to break the tie. The three cases were Garcetti v. 
Ceballos21 , Hudson v. Michigan22, and Kansas v. Marsh. 23 
18 Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court Justices, US News (May 12, 
2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/05/12/ranking-the-politics-
of-supreme-court-justices. 
This article describes voting tendencies of the Supreme Court Justices. 
19 Vaughn Ververs, You Say Scalito, I Say Alito, CBS News (November 1, 2005, 11:35 
AM) http:/ /www.cbsnews.com/830 1-500486 _162-999542-500486.html 
20Ilya Somin, Alito's Libertarian Streak, CATO Institute (November 10, 2005), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/alitos-libertarian-streak 
21 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Court held that a violation of the 
"knock-and-announce" rule by police does not require the suppression of the evidence 
found during a search. 
22 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that statements made by 
public employees pursuant to their official duties are not protected by the First 
Amendment from employer discipline. 
23 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did 
not prohibit states from imposing the death penalty when mitigating and aggressive 
sentencing factors were in equipoise. 
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In a 2012, the New York Court Watcher published an article articulating each 
Justices voting patterns on various topics?4 When it comes to highly partisan-charged 
cases, Justice Ali to votes like a conservative Republican politician 92% of the time. 
When it comes to more ideological voting patterns, Justice Alito votes conservative 88% 
of the time. Finally, when it comes to levels of judicial activism, Justice Ali to votes for 
activism (to· invalidate a law) nearly 63% of the time instead of voting for restraint and 
deferring t~ lawmakers. 
' 
Analysis of Justice Alito 's opinions 
This paper will further analyze ten opinions written by Justice Alito, including 3 
majority opinions, three concurring opinions, and four dissenting opinions. 
Analysis of Majority Opinions 
The first majority opinion written by Justice Alito is Davis v. Federal Electronics 
Commission. 25 In Davis, the Court held that §319(a) 26 and (b) 27 of the Bipartisan 
24 Part 7: Focus on Justice Alito, New York Court Watcher (May 25, 2012), 
http://www.newyorkcourtwatcher.com/2012/05/part-7-focus-on-justice-alito-
supreme.html. 
This article breaks down Justice Ali to's voting records. 
25 554 U.S. 724 (2008) 
26 §319(a) is also known as the "Millionaire's Amendment," which provides that when a 
candidates expenditure of personal funds exceeds $350,000 (known as the Opposition 
Personal Funds Amount), a new regulatory scheme comes into play. The non-self-
financing candidate will now be able to receive individual contributions at treble the 
normal limit of $2,300, and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit. 
27 §319(b) requires candidates to make three types of disclosures in order to calculate the 
OPF A: a declaration of intent revealing the amount of personal funds the candidate 
intends to spend in excess of $350,000, an "initial notification" within 24 hours of 
exceeding $350,000 mark, and an additional notification within 24 hours of making or 
becoming obligated to make each addition~_..expenditure of $10,000 or more using 
personal funds. Notifications must provide~e amount of each expenditure and must be 
filed with the Federal Election Commission. Candidate will be subject to civil and 
criminal penalties for failure to comply. 
8 
Campaign Reform Act28 are unconstitutional because they are a violation of the First 
Amendment right to spend one's own money to advocate for one's own election. First, 
Justice Ali to's opinion looked to determine whether or not Davis had standing to invoke 
federal jurisdiction. "To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury that is 
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant's 
challenged behavior' and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling." The majority 
stated that Da~is did have standing to challenge §319(b ). Since Davis ~as forced to file a 
. ' 
§319 (b) disclosure statement, a finding that §319(b) is unconstitutional would have 
spared him from making those disclosures and from being threatened with an 
enforcement action by the FEC. However, the majority further noted that just because 
Davis has standing to challenge §319 (b), it does not necessarily follow that he has 
standing to challenge §319(a). The FEC argued that Davis lacked standing to attack the 
constitutionality of §319(a) because he suffered no injury, since his opponent had not 
qualified for asymmetrical limits. The majority rejected FEC's argument, holding that the 
injury required for standing need not be actualized. A party has standing to sue where the 
threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct. The majority held that since Davis had 
declared his intent to spend at least $350,000 of his own money, he was faced with the 
threat of injury when his opponent was then allowed to receive contributions on more 
favorable terms. Further, the majority held that even though the election was over, the 
issues were not moot because the disputes were capable of being repeated. 
After determining that Davis did have standing, Justice Alito then turned to the 
merits of Davis' claim that the First Amendment was violated by the contribution limits 
28 The BCRA is a United States federal law that amended the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971, which regulates the fmancing of political campaigns. 
9 
imposed by §319(a). Justice Alito noted that for the campaign finance limitations to be 
constitutional, they must apply equally to all candidates and must be justified by 
important governmental interests. First, Justice Alito stated that §319 (a) requires a 
candidate to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered political 
speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limits. As a result, a candidate using 
personal funds to finance his campaign produces fundraising advantages for his 
opponent, thus imposing a substantial burden on the self-financing candidate. As §319(a) 
; ! 
imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal 
funds for campaign speech, Justice Alito stated that the provision couldn't stand unless it 
is justified by a compelling state interest. The FEC argued that the compelling state 
interest~ furthered by § 319( a) is the elimination of corruption or the perception of 
corruption. The majority rejected the FEC's anti-corruption argument, stating that since 
the statute gave liberalized limits for non-self-financing candidates, it doesn't make sense 
that the denial of liberalized limits to self-financing candidates can be regarded as serving 
anti-corruption goals sufficiently to justify the resulting constitutional burden. 
The FEC also argued that the §319(a)'s asymmetrical limits are justified because 
they essentially level the playing field between wealthy individuals and candidates who 
are not as wealthy. The majority stated in response to this argument that "the concept that 
government restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." !d., at 12. 
Finally, the majority discussed the remaining issue as to the constitutionality of 
§ 319(b)' s disclosure requirements. The majority stated that there must be a relevant 
correlation or substantial relation between the governmental interest and the information 
10 
required to be disclosed in order for the disclosure requirements to pass constitutional 
muster. The strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the 
actual burden on First Amendment rights. The majority found that since §319(b)' s 
disclosure requirements were designed to implement asymmetrical contribution limits 
provided for in § 319( a), now determined to be unconstitutional, the requirements of 
§319(b) cannot be justified and it follows that they too are unconstitutional. The majority 
held that the judgment of the District Court be reversed, and the case remanded for 
; ! 
further proceedings. 
The second majority opinion written by Justice Alito is National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), et al. v. Nelson, et al. 29 In NASA, the majority held that 
NASA's background checks of contract employees do not violate any constitutional 
privacy right.30 The basic facts are as follows: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a 
NASA facility that is operated by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), was 
subject to the requirement of background checks since JPL were staffed by contract 
employees. The respondents here, employees of JPL argued that the background checks 
violated a constitutional right to informational privacy and sued NASA, Caltech, and the 
Department of Commerce. The circuit court held that portions of the background-check 
forms were likely unconstitutional, particularly the parts requiring disclosure of drug 
treatment or counseling, as well as questions concerning an employees fmancial integrity 
and mental stability because they were not narrowly tailored to meet the Government's 
interests. 
29 131 S.Ct. 746 (2011). 
30 In 2004, President George W. Bush issued a directive requiring federal contract 
employees, with long-term access to federal facilities, to undergo background 
investigations. 
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In an 8-0 decision, the Supreme Court did not definitively state whether a 
constitutional privacy right exists. 31 However, as they have done in two previous cases, 
the Supreme Court hinted that such a right might exist, and assuming it does, ruled that 
the background checks do not violate such a right. 32 First, the Court noted that the 
questions challenged by the respondents are part of a standard employment background 
check of the sort used by millions of private employers. The only reason this situation 
arose was because of the requirement that federal contract employees, with long-term 
: ; 
access to federal facilities, were now required to submit to background checks, when they 
never were before. The Court noted that the Government has always had an interest in 
conducting basic employment background checks. The fact that Cal Tech was the direct 
employer makes no difference about the government's interest in this case, as JPL was 
operating under a Government contract. 
After establishing that the Government has an interest in administering 
background checks, the Court explained that the portions of the forms in question 
consisted of reasonable, employment-related inquiries that further the Government's 
interests in managing its internal operations. Justice Alito stated that the question asking 
employees about recent drug use is not irrelevant as the "Government is entitled to have 
its projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding persons who will efficiently and effectively 
discharge their duties."33 Justice Alito further stated that the follow-up questions 
regarding treatment and counseling is also reasonable as the Government uses those 
questions to separate out the drug users who have taken steps to address and overcome 
31 Justice Kagan did not take part in the consideration or the decision of this case. 
32 Court took this approach in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) and Nixon v. General 
Services Administration, 433 U.S 425 (1977). 
33 NASA at 10 
12 
their problems. Treatment, Alito states, is a mitigating factor that the Government uses to 
determining whether to grant contract employees long-term access to federal facilities. 
Also as to the issue of Governmental interest, the Court's opinion notes that the 
Government does not have the burden of demonstrating that the questions asked are 
"necessary" or the "least restrictive means" used to obtain the information. When the 
Government acts as a manager of its internal affairs, it only needs to show a "reasonable 
interest" in obtaining the inform,ation. 
As to the issue of whether the broad, open-ended questions violated respondents' 
informational-privacy rights, Justice Alito writes that the questions in this case are 
reasonably aimed to identify and separate strong candidates from the weaker candidates. 
The reasonableness of the open-ended questions is illustrated by their "pervasiveness in 
the public and private sector as the use of open-ended questions in employment 
background checks appears to be equally commonplace in both the private and public 
sector."34 Furthermore, any information obtained by the Government is protected from 
disclosure to the public under the Privacy Act. 35 Although Justices Ali to, Scalia, and 
Thomas tend to be in agreement on most issues, Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote their 
own, separate concurring opinions. Both Justices stated that the issue of a constitutional 
right to informational privacy should have been decided, and both believed it should have 
been decided in the negative. 
34 NASA at 11. 
35 The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, requires written consent before the 
Government may disclose records pertaining to any individual §552a(b). The Act also 
imposes criminal liability for willful violations of its nondisclosure 
obligations.§552a(i)(1 ). 
13 
The third and final majority opinion written by Justice Alito is Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable School Committee, et al. 36 The Supreme Court held in Fitzgerald that parents 
could sue a school committee under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
In doing so, the Supreme Court stated that Title IX37 does not preclude a 42 U.S.C. §1983 
action alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. 38 
A quick summary of the facts is as follows: Jacqueline Fitzgerald was a 
kindergartener in the Barnstable Sch9ol District. On separate occasions, a third-grade boy 
bullied Jacqueline. The first time, Jacqueline was bullied on the school bus. The second 
time, she was bullied in the classroom. The boy would bully Jacqueline into lifting up her 
skirt, pull down her underpants, and spread her legs. After the initial incident, the school 
set up a meeting between the parents, the school principal, and another school official. 
The alleged bully, the bus driver, and several students were also questioned, but the 
school could not corroborate Jacqueline's story. After the second incident occurred, 
another meeting was set up with Jacqueline's parents, but the school determined there 
was insufficient evidence to warrant discipline. The local police department also 
conducted their own investigation, but also found that there was insufficient evidence to 
bring criminal charges. The school principal did suggest remedial measures to the 
36 555 U.S. 246 (2009). 
37 Title IX is a portion of the Equal Opportunity in Education Act, which states that "No 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program 
or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. §1681(a). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in relevant part "Every person who ... subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 
14 
Fitzgeralds, which were rejected because the Fitzgeralds felt that the proposals were 
punishing their daughter (having her transfer busses). The Fitzgeralds requested that the 
school transfer the boy instead or place a monitor on the bus, but the school never acted 
on their requests. The Fitzgeralds began to drive their daughter to school instead, but the 
boy continued to bully Jacqueline at school, all of which were reported to the school. 
Finally, the Fitzgeralds filed suit, alleging that the school system's response to their 
allegations of sexual harassment had be~n inadequate. They claimed a violation of Title 
IX against the Barnstable School Committee and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The school committee filed a motion for summary judgment on the Title IX 
claim, which was granted by the District Court. The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's decision and held that Title IX precluded § 1983 claims 
based on equal protection. The Court of Appeals characterized Title IX' s implied private 
remedy as "sufficiently comprehensive to preclude use of§ 1983 to advance statutory 
claims based on Title IX itself." !d. at 5. The Court of Appeals believes that according to 
Congress, Title IX was the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free 
from gender discrimination perpetrated by educational institutions. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
Justice Ali to's opinion states that when determining whether a subsequent statute 
precludes the enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, the Court places primary 
emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute's remedial scheme, as well as Congress' 
legislative intent. Justice Alito states that Title IX has no administration exhaustion 
requirement and no notice provisions like other statutes have. Justice Alito also 
15 
recognized an implied right of action on behalf of the plaintiffs, which allows them to file 
directly in court and be eligible to obtain the full range of remedies. As a result, parallel 
and concurrent § 1983 claims will neither circumvent required procedures nor allow 
access to new remedies. Justice Alito goes on to also note that Title IX does not express a 
private means of redress, which leads the Court to believe that Congress did not intend to 
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for substantial equal protection claim. 
Finally, Justice Ali to compares the ~ubstantive rights and protections guaranteed 
under Title IX and under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Alito concluded that that 
Congress did not intend Title IX to preclude§ 1983 constitutional suits because Title IX's 
protections are narrower in some aspects, and broader in others. Justice Alito notes that 
Title IX has been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and 
other individuals, whereas § 1983 equal protection claims may be brought against 
individuals as well as municipalities and other state entities. The opinion also goes on to 
list several activities that may be challenged on constitutional grounds, but Title IX 
exempts from its restrictions, thus making them not actionable under Title IX. 
Furthermore, even when ~an activity is subject to both Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause, Justice Alito explains that the standards for establishing liability may 
not be wholly congruent. Therefore, the Court concluded that Title IX was not meant to 
be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools or a 
substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional rights. The Court held 
that § 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to the Fitzgeralds 
alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. 
Analysis of Concurring Opinions 
16 
The first of Justice Alito's concurring opinions to be analyzed is a Fourth 
Amendment case dealing with the issue of what constitutes a search. In United States v. 
Jones39, the Supreme Court held that installing a Global Positioning System tracking 
device on an automobile in order to monitor the car's movements did in fact constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 
In this case, the police suspected respondent Antoine Jones of various narcotics 
violations. The police obtained a warrant to atlfich GPS tracking device to the underside 
' 
of defendant's car. However, the warrant was applied for in the District of Columbia and 
to be installed within 10 days. On the 11th day, the GPS was installed in Maryland, not in 
the District of Columbia as the warrant stated. The police then continued to monitor the 
vehicle for 24 hours a day for 28 days after installing the device. The device gathered 
more than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-week period. The government was able to 
gather enough information from the GPS device to bring a multiple-count indictment 
against Jones, ultimately finding him guilty on conspiracy to distribute and to possession 
with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more grams of 
cocaine base. Jones argued that the installation of the GPS device constituted an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia overturned his conviction based on a finding that the installation of 
the GPS device was a search because it violated Jones' reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the installation of the GPS 
device without a warrant violates Jones' Fourth Amendment rights. All nine justices 
39 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) 
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voted unanimously that it did in fact violate Jones' Fourth Amendment right, but they did 
not agree on the reasoning. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the 
installation of the GPS device constituted a trespass on private property and thus violated 
Jones' right to be free from an unreasonable search. Justice Alito, in his concurring 
opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, felt that the GPS 
device violated Jones' "reasonable expectation of privacy," and thus constituted a search. 
The majority stated that when determining 'ihether a "search" had occurred under 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the appropriate inquiry is whether or not a 
trespass or physical intrusion of private property had occurred. Although Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that in Katz the Court used the "reasonable expectation of privacy" 
approach to determine whether or not there was a search, he also argued that numerous 
post-Katz cases used the "trespass" inquiry to determine whether a search had occurred. 
40 Justice Scalia believes that the Fourth Amendment provides more than one level of 
protection. The initial inquiry should be that of trespass, and then, if there was no 
trespass, whether or not the defendant has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." In this 
case, since the majority feels that the installation of the GPS device was a trespass, there 
is no need to determine any further whether Jones' reasonable expectation of privacy was 
violated. 
The nickname "Scali to" refers to Justice Ali to's similarities in his views with 
Justice Scalia. Although they both agree in the holding of this case, they take very 
different approaches in reaching their decision. Justice Alito did not believe that trespass 
4° Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)- In Katz, the Court held that individuals 
with a "reasonable expectation of privacy" are protected from unreasonable search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
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was the proper inquiry in a case where the issue is a GPS device. Justice Alito believes 
that in a case where an electronic device was used, Katz 's "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test should be the appropriate inquiry. 
Justice A lito explained in detail the history ofF ourth Amendment search 
analyses. Before Katz, cases in which there was no trespass, it was held that there was no 
search. Katz finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not 
required for a Fourth Amendment violation.41 Even th?ugh the means used by the police 
to listen in on phone conversations did not physically intrude on the area occupied by the 
defendant, the Court held that an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation. Justice Alito cites to the Court's decision in Oliver v. 
United States42, where the Court found there to be a trespass, but not a Fourth 
Amendment Violation. In Oliver, the Court wrote, "The existence of a property right is 
but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. The 
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has 
been discredited." 
Justice Alito's opinion also points to flaws in the majority's reasoning. He 
believes the majority's reliance on trespass will lead to incongruous results based on the 
type of surveillance used (attaching a device for a short period of time is unconstitutional, 
but following the same car for a much longer period of time using unmarked cars would 
not be), may be difficult to apply in certain states (community property states), and cause 
problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, but not 
41 Katz involved the use of a listening device that was attached to the outside of a public 
telephone booth and that allowed police officers to eavesdrop on one end to the phone 
conversation. 
42 466 U.S. 170 (1984) 
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physical, contact with the item being tracked. Justice Alito believes the Katz-based 
expectation of privacy test allows the Court to circumvent those problems, while also 
being able to adapt to society's ever changing expectations of privacy. "The availability 
and use of ... new devices will continue to shape the average person's expectations about 
the privacy of his or her daily movements." 
The second concurring opinion to be discussed is Justice Ali to's opinion in 
~alazar v. Buono.43 Salazar dealt with the issue of a cross, that was placed on federal 
. ; 
ground as a war memorial. The memorial cross, having been located at the Mojave 
National Preserve since 1934, was ordered to be taken down after a District Court found 
that the location of the cross on federal ground violated the Establishment Clause.44 In 
order to comply with the District Court's permanent injunction, while not offending war 
veterans, Congress passed a land exchange agreement in which an acre of land containing 
the cross was conveyed to the VFW in consideration for 5 acres of land. This way the 
location of the cross would no longer be on federal land. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding that the 
land exchange transfer was an attempt to evade the permanent injunction and therefore 
invalid, and also affmned the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
43 559 U.S. 700 (2010) 
44 The First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making 
any law "respecting an establishment of religion." This clause not only forbids the 
government from establishing an official religion, but also prohibits government actions 
that unduly favor one religion over another. It also prohibits the government from unduly 
preferring religion over non-religion, or non-religion over religion. 
http:/ /www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_ clause 
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In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found that the cross may stay, but remanded 
the case for further proceedings. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, and 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ali to in part, held that the District Court erred 
in ordering an injunction and removal of the cross. Justice Kennedy's opinion states that 
a court must consider all of the circumstances bearing on the need for preventive relief 
before ordering an injunction. In regard to the land transfer statute, Justice Kennedy 
believes that the District Court failed to consider the context in which the land transfer 
! i 
statute was enacted. In ordering the case to be remanded, the plurality concluded that the 
District Court should conduct a proper inquiry into the necessity for injunctive relief in 
light of the land transfer statute. 
Justice Ali to, concurring in the judgment, wrote his own concurring opinion. 
Justice Alito wrote that he agreed with Justice Kennedy's opinion except that he would 
not remand the case for the lower courts to decide whether implementation of the land 
transfer statute would violate the District Court's injunction or the Establishment Clause. 
Justice Alito believes that the facts have been sufficiently developed to allow the 
Supreme Court to decide the case, concluding that the statute may be implemented. 
Justice Alito notes that the District Court did not take into account the context in which 
the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage. Alito writes that the purpose of 
the cross was not to promote a Christian message, but to honor fallen soldiers. Thus, the 
Government was caught in a dilemma- either remove the cross and risk offending the 
veterans who fought for our country, or risk a violation of the Constitution. Therefore, 
Congress passed the land-transfer statute. Justice Alito states that Congress chose the 
land-transfer statute as an "alternative approach designed to eliminate any perception of 
21 
religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally owned land, 
while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism associated with the destruction 
of the monument." Justice Alito also agrees with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion that 
the meaning of the injunction was that the Government could not allow the cross to 
remain on federal land, a problem solved by the land-transfer statute. 
Finally, Justice Alito addresses the dissents ;ofnt that implementing the statute 
would ~onstitute an endorsement of Christianity and therefore v,iolate the Establishment 
i ; 
Clause. Using the "endorsement test," Justice Alito notes that an observer familiar with 
the origin and history of the monument would also know that the monument is located on 
privately owned property, and the owner has no obligation to preserve the monument's 
present design. Thus, as Justice Alito believes, a reasonable observer would appreciate 
the fact the Congress was trying to find an accommodating solution to a difficult 
situation. 
The final concurring opinion written by Justice Alito to be discussed is Crawford 
v. Metropolitan Government ofNashville.45 By unanimous decision, the Court held that 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protects an employee from unlawful sexual 
harassment even though the harassed employees did not report the harassment 
themselves. The Court found that as long as an employee cooperated with an 
investigation of the alleged misconduct, he or she is still protected under the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII. 
Vicky Crawford had been working for Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 
Davidson County for nearly 30 years. In 2002, the department of human resources began 
45 555 us 271 (2009) 
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to investigate Dr. Gene Hughes, an employee relations director working for the Metro 
School District, after several woman had complained that Dr. Hughes had sexually 
harassed them. Since Crawford had worked closely with Dr. Hughes, she was questioned 
during the investigation. Crawford described several occasions where Dr. Hughes 
sexually harassed her. However, because there were no witnesses to Crawford's, or any 
of the other women's allegations, no disciplinary action was taken against Dr. Hughes. 
However, ~tll of the women, including Crawford, who responded th~t Hughes had 
sexually harassed them, were fired. After being fired, Crawford sued her former 
employer under Title VII.46 The District Court held that Title VII did not protect 
Crawford because she did not oppose the illegal conduct, she was only responding to an 
investigation. The Court also held that Crawford was not protected against retaliation for 
her dismissal because her employer initiated the investigation and a charge had not been 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission until after she had been 
terminated. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's 
interpretation of the word "oppose" in the statute. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the word 
"oppose" to mean an active or consistent opposition to the behavior being complained of. 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court found that since Crawford did not initiate the investigation, 
she did not "oppose" the behavior. The majority however, held that since the word 
"oppose" is not defined anywhere in the statue, that it carries its ordinary dictionary 
46 Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by covered employers 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
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meaning. 47 Thus, the word "oppose" goes beyond active behavior and applies to a 
situation where someone has not taken any action to advance a position besides merely 
disclosing it. The Court found that one may "oppose" behavior just by responding to 
someone else's question rather than initiating a complaint. Metro argued for the Sixth 
Circuit's interpretation of the word "oppose," stating that employers will be less likely to 
raise questions about possible discrimination if an employee can easily raise a retaliation 
charge if things go badly for the employee. The majority rejected Metro's argument as 
~ : 
being inconsistent with the statute's primary objective of avoiding harm to employees, 
and would undermine the Faragher-Ellerth scheme.48 The Court held that if an employee 
who reported discrimination only by responding to an employer's questions could be 
penalized without remedy, then employees would have a good reason not to report the 
discrimination at all. 
Justice Ali to wrote his own concurring opinion, joined in by Justice Thomas. 
Justice Alito notes that although he agrees with the majority's primary reasoning, he 
wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's holding "does not and should not extend 
beyond employees who testify in internal investigations or engage in analogous 
47 The Court in Crawford used the definition according to Webster's New International 
Dictionary 1 71 0 (2d ed.195 8)- "to resist or antagonize ... ; to contend against; to confront; 
resist; withstand." 
48 The Faragher-Ellerth scheme is a defense created from the following cases: Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998). The Faragher-Ellerth Defense is an affirmative defense employers may 
use to defend against claims of hostile work environment harassment by supervisors or 
their superiors. Employers may attempt to use the defense if: 1. No tangible adverse 
employment action was taken against the plaintiff, 2. The employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and promptly correct the harassing behavior, or 3. The plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm. 
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purposive conduct."49 Justice Alito disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation that 
"opposition" must be consistent and initiated by the employee, but stating that it must be 
"active and purposive." Justice Alito recognized that the majority's definition of oppose 
could also consist of "silent" opposition, which may be problematic since it is 
questionable whether that is protected as well. Justice Alito has a "slippery slope" type 
concern in allowing "silent" opposition, stating that protecting conduct that is silent may 
"open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a word of 
~ ! 
opposition to their employers. "50 Of particular concern to Justice Ali to is the "water 
cooler hypothetical" where an employee may have expressed opposition to sexual 
harassment in a private conversation, say at the water cooler or in a private phone call. 
Justice Alito feels this would lead to uncertainty regarding the time when the employer 
became aware of the employer's private expression of opposition. Finally, Justice Ali to 
noted that Equal Employment Opportunity Commission retaliation charges doubled 
between 1992 and 2007 and fears that expanding the interpreted protected opposition 
conduct would likely cause this trend to accelerate further. 
Analysis of Dissenting Opinions 
The first of Justice Ali to's dissenting opinions to be analyzed is Florida v. 
Jardines. 51 Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy and Breyer, joined Justice 
Alito's dissent. Traditionally, these four justices do not take similar stands on the same 
issue and dissent together. The majority held that a search of the immediate surroundings 
of a home, through the use of a trained police dog, is a "search" within the meaning of the 
49 Crawford at 6. 
50 ld at 7. 
51 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013) 
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Fourth Amendment. Thus, absent consent, the search would require probable cause and a 
search warrant. 
In reaching its decision, the majority focused on the important of homeowner's 
property rights as opposed to their privacy rights. Following the precedent set in United 
States v. Jones, discussed above, the majority notes that when there is a physical intrusion 
by police onto a persons home for the purpose of obtaining information, a search has 
occurred. The majority discusses the protection of the home as being a core value of the 
~ i 
Fourth Amendment. Even though a visitor coming onto one's property has the right to 
approach the door, knock, wait for an answer and then leave, a visitor does not have an 
invitation to linger on the property or peer into the home. A visitor is not implicitly 
licensed by the homeowner to linger, and such behavior constitutes a trespass. Thus, 
bringing a trained police dog up to the door of a home to identify smells of illegal 
substances constitutes an unreasonable search without a warrant. 
Justice Alito vehemently disagrees with the majority's analysis, arguing that their 
decision is based on a "putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the 
annals of Anglo-Americanjurisprudence."52 Justice Alito argues that the law of trespass 
gives members of the public a license to use the walkway to approach the front door of a 
house and remain there for a brief time, just as the officers in this case did. The license, 
Alito states, is not limited to people who intend to speak to the homeowner, but extends 
to solicitors, mail carriers, and police officers who wish to gather evidence. A visitor is 
not required to ring the doorbell. Justice Ali to disagrees that a trespass occurred here just 
because a trained police dog accompanied the officer, noting that the majority could not 
52 Jar dines at 9. 
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find a single case to support their conclusion. Justice Alito notes that there are restrictions 
on a visitor's course of conduct: the visitor must conform to conduct that would be 
reasonably expected from a visitor. A visitor would be expected to stick to a path or 
paved walkway; a visitor would be expected to refrain from wandering into the backyard 
or looking through bushes, or coming to the front door in the middle of the night. Further, 
the license to approach the home is limited to the amount of time it would customarily 
take to approach, pause l~ng enough to~ someone is home, and then leave. Jusrice 
Ali to also discusses the implied right to approach with regard to police officers. Police 
officers do not engage in a search when they "approach the front door of a residence and 
seek to engage in what is termed a 'knock and talk."53 Even when the objective of a 
"knock and talk" is to obtain evidence, Justice Alito argues that the license to approach 
still applies. With regards to the conduct of the officer in this case, Justice Ali to believes 
the officer did not exceed the scope of the license to approach. Ali to notes the officer 
adhered to the customary path, approached at a reasonable hour, and remained at the front 
door for less than a minute or two. 
The majority felt that the officer went too far in approaching the home because he 
had the objective purpose of conducting a search; Justice Ali to disagrees. Based on this 
rationale, Justice Ali to argues that any standard "knock and talk" would not be 
f;JJ 
considered a search. Justice Alito notes that police almost always approac~ome with the 
purpose of discovering information, which is the basic purpose of a "knock and talk." 
The majority contends that a "knock and talk" is different because it involves talking, 
which all are invited to do. Justice Alito counters this point by mentioning that even when 
53 !d. at 11. 
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officer's conduct a "knock and talk," they may still observe items in plain view and smell 
odors coming from the home. 
Justice Alito also believes that the majority's decision fails under the "reasonable 
expectation of privacy test," because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for 
odors emanating from the home. Justice Alito declares that he would not draw a line 
between odors that can be smelled by a dog, but not by a human. The majority compared 
the use of a dog to the use o~ a thermal imaging device in Kyollo v. United States. 54 . 
~ t 
However, Justice Alito argues that a dog is not a new form of technology like the thermal 
imaging device in Kyollo was. Further, Justice Ali to cites that police have used dogs for 
their acute sense of smell for centuries and even notes that under common law, unleashed 
dogs were allowed to wander on private property without committing a trespass. 
The second of Justice Ali to's dissenting opinions comes in United States v. 
Alvarez. 55 The majority in Alvarez held that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment's free speech protections. 56 The incident at issue occurred 
when Xavier Alvarez introduced himself at district board meeting as a retired marine who 
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. After it was discovered that Alvarez's 
statements were not true, he was indicted for violating the Stolen Valor Act. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court in California's 
rejection of Alvarez's claim that the Act was unconstitutional. 
54 533 U.S. 27 (2001). The majority in Kyollo held that the use of a thermal imaging 
device from a public street to monitor heat radiation emanating from a home was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, requiring a warrant. 
55 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
56 Stolen Valor Act made it illegal for unauthorized persons to wear, buy, sell, barter, 
trade, or manufacture "any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the armed 
forces of the United States, or any of the service medals or badges awarded to the 
members of such forces. 120 STAT. 3266 
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The plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor stated that false statements are not excluded from 
First Amendment protection just because they are false in nature. The Court has never 
found in prior cases that false statements should constitute a new category of unprotected 
speech like there is for perjury or threats of violence. Further, the plurality opinion 
addressed the breadth of the Act. In particular, Justice Kennedy writes how the Act 
applies to a false statement that :is made regardless of the time or place, whether 
whispered in the home or made in public. Finally, Justice Kennedy's opinion states that 
the Government did not show how the Act's restriction of free speech exceeds the 
Government's interest in protecting the integrity of the military honors system. 
Restrictions on speech are subject to a strict scrutiny test, which the Government did not 
meet. The plurality opinion notes that the difference between this case and unprotected 
speech, such as when making a threat, is that these types of false statements alone do not 
present a grave and imminent threat. 
Justice Breyer wrote the concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan. They 
believed that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional under an intermediate scrutiny 
test. Basically, the concurring opinion stated that the Act fails under the intermediate 
scrutiny test because it applies in situations where no harm is done; that its restriction on 
speech is not proportional to the government's interest in protecting false statements. 
Justice Alito's dissent, joined by the more usual company of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, recognized that the statute created by Congress could not have been drafted 
more narrowly. The statute only reached knowingly false statements made by the 
speaker. Further, Justice Alito argues that the majority broke from a long lines of cases 
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recognizing that the right to free speech does not protect one who makes false factual 
statements that inflict real harm and serve no purpose. 
Justice Alito describes five ways in which the statute is narrowly limited. First, 
the act only applies to narrow categories of making false statements where the facts can 
always be proved or disproved with certainty. Second, the type of speech that Act seeks 
to disqualify is squarely within the speaker's control. Third, conviction under the act 
requires proof beyond a reasonable ~oubt that the speaker knew the representation was 
i 
false. Fourth, the Act only reaches statements that cannot be interpreted as dramatic 
performances, satire, parody, hyperbole, or the like. Finally, the Act is strictly viewpoint 
neutral, having no ties to any particular political or ideological message. Noting a 
growing problem of false claims being made concerning the receipt of military awards, 
Congress passed the Stolen Valor Act. Justice Ali to argues that the Act is consistent with 
other laws passed by Congress, such 18 U.S.C. §704(a), which makes it a federal offense 
for anyone to wear, manufacture, or sell military decorations without authorization. The 
Act attempts to prevent those making the misrepresentations from unlawfully obtaining 
financial or other material awards, veteran's benefits, and the like. Further, Justice Alito 
describes it as a "slap in the face of veterans who have paid their price and earned their 
medals."57 
Justice Alito counters the plurality opinion's argument that Congress could have 
preserved the integrity of the honors by different means. Ali to argues that the alternative, 
a public database of all recipients, would not work because the Department of Defense 
has explained that it cannot create a database for recipients prior to 2001. 
57 Alvarez at 1 7. 
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Next, Justice Alito argues that false factual statements possess no intrinsic First 
Amendment value. Alito recognizes that the First Amendment does not protect false 
statements consisting of fraud, perjury, and defamation. To support his argument that the 
First Amendment does not always protect knowingly false statements, Justice Ali to states 
that there are more than 1 00 federal criminal statues that punish false statements made in 
connection with areas of federal agency concern. Although Justice Ali to agreed with 
Justice Breyer that in today's world so .called "white lies" are harmless and sometimes 
; 
useful (such as to prevent embarrassment or protect privacy), he differentiated those 
types of lies with the type made unlawful by the Act. He notes that Alvarez's lies served 
no lawful purpose, nor did they attempt to prevent an embarrassment or protect one's 
privacy. The types of statements made by Alvarez consisted of no intrinsic value, and fail 
to serve any instrumental purpose that the First Amendment might protect. Thus, 
Alvarez' material misrepresentation should not be protected by the First Amendment. 
JD.B. v. North Carolina58 is the third case to discuss where Justice Alito wrote a 
dissenting opinion. This time, more familiar Justices joined Justice Ali to: Justices 
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas. JD.B. was a case where the Supreme Court found that age 
is a relevant factor when determining custody for Miranda purposes. J.D.B. was an 
under-age, special education student who was suspected of committing multiple 
robberies. A police investigator, a uniformed police officer, and school officials 
interrogated J.D.B., where he confessed to the crimes. At no time was J.D.B. informed of 
his Miranda rights or given the opportunity to contact his parents. Any attempts during 
trial to suppress the confession because Miranda was never given were denied on the 
58 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011). 
31 
grounds that J.D.B. was not in police custody. The majority held that J.D.B.'s age should 
have been a consideration in determining whether or not he was in police custody and 
should have been given his Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the lower court to make a new finding on custody, taking into account J.D.B. 'sage. 
The majority found that "To hold, as the State requests, that a child's age is never 
relevant to whether a suspect has been taken into custody - and thus to ignore the very 
real differences between children and adu,lts - would be to deny children the full scope of 
i 
the procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees to adults."59 The majority's main point 
was that age is relevant in that it affects how a "reasonable person" in the suspect's 
position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. The Court noted that an adult's 
judgment and way of thinking is much different than that of a child's. For example, an 
adult may be able to determine whether or not they are free to leave from a police 
investigation, whereas a child may feel coerced to stay even though they would be free to 
leave. The Court discusses that children and adults also differ when it comes to maturity, 
behavior, experience, and susceptibility. To emphasize this point further, the majority 
cites to various examples where the law limits or disqualifies children from various 
activities- such as managing property, entering into a binding contract, and marrying 
without parental consent. The Court held that "so long as the child's age is known to the 
officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a 
reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective 
nature of that [Miranda] test. "60 
59 JD.B. at 11 
60 !d. at 9 
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Justice Alito's dissenting opinion focused on the majority's holding being 
inconsistent with the primary justifications of the Miranda Rule: "the perceived need for 
a clear rule that can easily be applied in all cases." Justice Alito notes that the Miranda 
rule places a high value on clarity and certainty. A key contributor to this clarity has been 
the objective reasonable-person test for determining custody.61 Justice Alito feels as 
though the majority ' s decision shifts the Miranda custody determination from a simple, 
one-size-fits-all test into an inquiry that now ~ust account for the age of the suspect. 
Thus, as was discussed in Justice Ali to's concurring opinion in Crawford, Justice Ali to is 
concerned with the "slippery-slope" that this decision may cause. Alito notes that age is 
not the only personal characteristic that may be correlated with susceptibility to coercive 
pressures, and fears that this decision will lead to more characteristics being considered. 
Thus, as Justice Alito puts it, the Court's decision will transform the Miranda test from 
an easy applied rule into a "highly fact-intensive standard resembling the voluntariness 
test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory. 62 
Justice Ali to notes that historically, the Courts applying this test have focused 
solely on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and not the personal 
characteristics of the person being interrogated. In fact, Justice Ali to further contends that 
the totality of the external circumstances, such as the interrogation itself, is what matters 
to the Court's whereas personal characteristics of a suspect have consistently been 
rejected. 
61 The custody analysis considers whether or not a hypothetical person would consider 
himself to be confined under the particular circumstances of the situation. 
62 !d. at 12 
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To counter the majority's reasoning for considering age as a factor, Alito notes 
that many people over the age of 18 are also more susceptible to police pressure than the 
hypothetical reasonable person. Justice Alito states that Miranda's rigid standard are both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive, but they at least provide one standard for police to 
follow. That is why, as Justice Alito puts it, no other Supreme Court case dealing with 
Miranda has before mentioned anything to do with age or other personalized 
characteristics. Further, if the majority considers age to be a relevant factor, Justice Alito 
' 
questions how age differs from other factors such as intelligence, cultural background, 
education, etc. Justice Alito points out that litigants will soon cite to the majority's 
holding for the proposition that other characteristics should be treated like age and taken 
into account for purposes of administering Miranda. In the end, Justice Ali to feels the 
majority's decision today takes the Miranda rule from a simple, clear, and concise test, to 
a test that is hard for police to follow and difficult for judges to apply. 
The final case to be discussed is Snyder v. Phelps. 63 Just as in Alvarez, discussed 
above, Justice Ali to again dissents in a First Amendment case. Also like in Alvarez, 
Justice Alito believes that the First Amendment should not protect speech that intends to 
inflict harm or has no intrinsic value. The Snyder decision received much media attention 
and coverage. Albert Snyder, the father of a fallen Marine, brought a suit for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against Fred Phelps and his church, the Westboro Baptist 
Church. Phelps and the WBC picketed Snyder's funeral while holding signs condemning 
homosexuality. The signs read as such: "You're going to hell", "God hates you", "Fag 
63 131 S Ct. 1207 (2011) 
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troops", "Semper fi fags", and Thank God for dead soldiers."64 The WBC also published 
an article online denouncing Snyder for raising their son Catholic, which the WBC saw 
as "raising him for the devi1."65 This wasn't the first funeral picketed by the WBC, as 
they have done so at numerous funerals across the United States. 
In an 8-1 decision, with Justice Alito being the sole dissenter, the Court held that 
the WBC could not be liable for emotional distress, regardless of how outrageous the 
speech was. The Court reasoned that as long as the sr:eech was on a public sidewalk, 
aimed at a public issue, it must receive constitutional protection. The factor the majority 
harped on the most was the type of speech at issue. Categorizing the speech as a "matter 
of public concern", the majority firmly believes that matters of political, social, or public 
concern are entitled to First Amendment protections. The content, form, and context of 
the speech are looked at to determine whether the speech is of public matter. To this 
regard, the Court notes that most of the signs were not addressed to the Snyder family in 
particular. Most of the signs were critical of the United States government, the military, 
and homosexuality. The Court further noted that the funeral service itself was not 
disturbed, the WBC had conducted its picketing peacefully on public property, and that 
Snyder could not hear the WBC's negative speech, nor could he see any more than the 
top of the picketer's signs. 
Justice Ali to, as the lone dissenter in this case, believed that freedom of speech is 
not a license for "vicious verbal assault." Justice Ali to does not believe that picketers 
may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private people at times of emotional 
sensitivity. His basis for this argument is that we allow recovery in tort for the intentional 
64 Snyder at 9 
65 !d. at 15 
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infliction of emotional distress. Thus, he argues, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form "no essential part of exposition 
of ideas ... of slight social value ... that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."66 Justice Alito whole-
heartedly believes that when one intentionally inflicts grave injury, the First Amendment 
should not interfere with recovery. Justice Alito notes that on the day of the funeral, the 
,WBC could have chosen a different location to picket, b~1t they chose Snyder' s funeral in 
order to gamer more attention from the media. Thus, any reasonable person Alito argues, 
would assume that there was a connection between the messages displayed and Snyder or 
that they were directed at Snyder. 
Addressing the majority ' s rationale that the First Amendment protects the WBC' s 
speech, Alito counters with three different points. First, Alito notes that the First 
Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements made on matters of public 
concern, and that the WBC' s attack on the Snyder family should be treated the same. 
Second, even though the messages were of a public matter, they still attacked the 
character of a private figure and should not be protected. Finally, Ali to sees no reason 
why statements made on a public street, in close proximity to the funeral, should be 
regarded as "a free-fire zone in which otherwise actionable verbal attacks are shielded 
from liability. "67 Ali to argues that location of the tort is not dispositive. Comparing to a 
physical assault, an assailant who was lawfully on the property where the assault occurs 
is not a defense of the assault that took place. What seemed to trouble Justice Alito the 
most was that the majority's decision allows innocent victims to be harassed and verbally 
66 !d. at 14 
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assaulted during an emotional time where they are grieving the loss of a loved one, 
without being able to recover for the infliction of emotional distressed caused to them. 
For the final part of this paper, I will discuss my views on how Justice Alito's past 
and philosophy have influenced his decisions. Justice Alito has been labeled as a 
conservative. His judicial record shows that he votes conservatively on issues, as well as 
sides with the other conservative justices a strong majority of the time. During his time at 
Pripceton, he was a part of the ultra conservative group, the, Concerned Alumni of 
Princeton. Growing up as an Italian-American, Justice Alito held close ties to his family, 
community, and his church. Yet, I do not believe "conservative" is the correct label for 
Justice Alito. A better-suited label for Justice Alito would be "pragmatist." Every Justice 
takes the facts into consideration when rendering an opinion, however I believe Justice 
Ali to takes it one step further. Instead of just taking the facts as presented to him, Justice 
Ali to's analysis runs much deeper. His analysis is never just black and white. It takes 
into account more than just facts; it considers the context, the environment, and the 
situation in which those facts occurred. Justice Ali to's opinions also tend to include a 
discussion of a ruling's effect well into the future. For example, in Snyder, while the rest 
of the Court found that public speech on public property was constitutionally protected 
no matter how outrageous, Justice Alito took his analysis in a different direction. His 
analysis considered the intentions of the WBC in their speech, as well as the door that 
might be opened by the majority's decision. He discussed how the public speech was 
purposely aimed at the Snyder family with the intention of causing harm and how the 
location was chosen for the sole purpose of amplifying their hateful message. Twice more 
we see Justice Ali to's analysis take into consideration the future ramifications of his 
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decisions. In Crawford and again in J.D. B., Alito takes into consideration the "slippery 
slope" effect of his decision. In Crawford, Ali to was concerned that allowing "silent" 
opposition to be protected conduct in regard to harassment in the workplace, would 
"open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a word of 
opposition to their employers."68 Again in J.D.B., we see that in considering whether age 
should a factor in administering Miranda warnings, Justice Alito felt that the effect of 
doing ,so would lead to other personal characteristics being inc~uded in the analysis in the 
! ~ 
future. Thus, the simple and clear Miranda test would then tum into a test that is difficult 
to administer. 
J.D. B. was not the only time we saw Justice Alito being concerned with changing 
a law and the effects that may have. In Jardines, Justice Alito opposed the majority's 
analysis using trespass to determine Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, Justice Ali to 
would have used the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as had been established in 
Katz v. United States. 69 Ali to noted the negative effects that would result for police 
officers attempting to "knock and talk" under the majority's reasoning. 
Finally, I feel that the best case to read to get a true understanding of how Justice 
Alito analyzes cases would be Salazar v. Buono, the case concerning the cross as a 
monument on federal ground. Although the cross was on federal ground, and although I 
think everyone realized the land exchange statute was just a ploy to bypass the District 
Court's injunction, Justice Alito said it best when discussing the "reasonable person" 
standard to decide the case. A reasonable person would have realized the true meaning of 
the monument was to honor fallen soldiers of United States, not for the government to 
68 9 12 S. Ct. 846 at 7 
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occurs in the private between two consenting adults, it should not be illegal. That is how 
Justice Ali to always thought, and continues to do so today. 
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